Eber sentenced to six years

Nicholas Eber, 24
Nicholas Eber, 24

By: Editor-in-Chief Emily Feldmesser and Managing Editor Adelle Brodbeck

Held in the arms of his 19-year-old brother, Nicholas Eber entered the Delaware County Court House Monday morning to be sentenced for the stabbing of Anthony Peddle (‘14).

On Dec. 12, 2014 Eber was found guilty on counts of attempted murder, felonious assault and aggravated burglary for events that took place at the Chi Phi fraternity house in May. On Monday, Jan. 26, 2015 the charge of felonious assault was dropped.

Judge Everett H. Krueger sentenced Eber to six years for attempted murder, and three for aggravated burglary, both to be served concurrently. This means he will serve both sentences at once, spending a total of six years in prison. Upon release from prison, he will serve probation for five years. Eber must pay restitution to cover the remaining cost of Peddle’s medical bills.

Krueger emphasized the importance of the court’s objective enforcement of the law. He declined to consider the weight of Eber’s petition of innocence, compiled by his mother Christine.

The families and friends of both victim and defendant were present during the sentencing. Melissa Peddle, the victim’s mother, told the courtroom of her and her husband’s hardships since the stabbing last spring.

“We are both disabled veterans,” she said. “We suffer from severe depression and PTSD.”

She continued to comment on the fact that Eber’s attack on her son has, and will, continue to affect her family’s livelihood forever.

During his mother’s speech, Anthony Peddle could be seen wiping tears away from his eyes.

“Shouldn’t Mr. Eber’s sentencing be as long as Anthony’s?” Mrs. Peddle said.

Anthony Peddle told the court how his mental state has been altered by Eber’s actions. Peddle said he is unable to be alone and has trouble sleeping through the night.

“I still have a sledgehammer and screwdriver under my pillow,” he said. Before Eber addressed the judge, his attorney Joel Spitzer made his last remarks.

“For the most part he was a law-abiding citizen,” Spitzer said of his client. “If Nick wanted to ‘finish the job’ so to speak, he had the opportunity.”

In a brief statement, Eber attempted to convey his remorse. “I have been trying to live my life the way I’m supposed to,” Eber said. ”Go to school, get a job, start a family. I did everything I was supposed to do, and this still happened.”

Three members of Eber’s family spoke, including his father and younger brother. His father, Patrick Eber, said, “Nick has always been one of the most responsible people I know…I just ask for mercy.”

His brother John spoke of their relationship and how Nicholas Eber taught him to face high school bullies without using violence.

After Krueger handed down the sentence, Eber declared he would go through with the appeal process and requested an attorney.

As Eber was escorted out of the courtroom, he asked a deputy if he could say goodbye to his mother. Upon the deputy’s rejection, Mrs. Eber began to sob, and whispered to her son, “Stay strong, I love you.”

Even after the sentencing, she continued to proclaim Eber’s innocence.

Comments and context for “Kindertransport”

Junior Katie Patrick as Eva leans on junior Margot Reed as Helga.
Junior Katie Patrick as Eva leans on the shoulder of junior Margot Reed as Helga.

By Dr. Thomas Wolber

From Feb. 18 to 22, Ohio Wesleyan University’s department of theatre and dance will perform Kindertransport, an award-winning 1993 play by British author Diane Samuels. To read it was difficult, in more ways than one, so it might be appropriate to provide some historical background and context so that the audience might develop a fuller and more accurate understanding of what the author is trying to accomplish. The goal of this article is to establish a framework, not to reveal any specific plot details or to comment on the production.

Most Americans take it for granted that their lives are safe and secure, stable and predictable. That is not the norm in many other countries, and that has not been the norm in human history. Today, there are more than 33 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) who were forced to flee their homes as a result of conflict. If you add the millions more who have crossed international borders to save their lives, the staggering number is over 51 million, the highest since World War II. Astonishingly, half of them are children. Many refugees never reach safety during their passage – they are killed, or drown or die of starvation and diseases. In addition, many countries eye migrants with suspicion and hostility or deny them entry altogether. Even those individuals or families who do reach a safe haven often end up in temporary refugee camps where they are treated like lepers and languish in legal limbo for years and decades, unable to work and become productive members of society again.

World War II was one of those horrific times in world history, when some 55 million people perished and tens of millions more were forced to flee their ancestral land either as a result of combat or the redrawing of political borders. For example, millions of Germans and Austrians fled Nazi Germany and went abroad, not all of them Jewish. At the end of the war, millions more Germans were uprooted and had to abandon their former homes in areas that are now part of Poland or the Czech Republic to seek safety in western Europe.

The wrenching fate of one of those refugees or migrants is the topic of Kindertransport. In 1938 and 1939, after the “Kristallnacht” (the Night of the Broken Glass) and before the outbreak of World War II, nearly 10,000 German-Jewish children were evacuated to England. Many of them would never again see their parents who stayed behind and perished in concentration camps such as Buchenwald or Dachau. Thus, little Eva (only nine years old at the time) becomes separated not only from her parents, but from her language, religion, culture and identity. Over the years, she adjusts, but it is very clear that throughout her adult life she remains haunted and scarred as a result.

She never recovers from being uprooted, and her profound loss leads to lifelong depression and melancholy. She has difficulty relating to other people, including her own daughter. The mental anguish and emotional damage of Eva (or Evelyn, as she calls herself later in life) is one of the main motifs of the play. There are others, but they all have their origins in the original dispossession and dislocation. For example, just like Eva’s life is like a broken and dysfunctional piece of crystal, so the language of the play is fragmented and tortured. Eva’s unspeakable suffering is so great that she prefers the protection of forgetting over the pain of remembrance. She was too young and vulnerable to bear the separation and indicates at one point that she would have preferred to die alongside her parents rather than being shipped to England. The idea of survival rings hollow if the price is lifelong agony.

Despite the obvious references to Hitler and Nazi Germany, the play is not primarily a historical play – it is a complicated narrative in which past and present, history and mythology are interwoven. It contains many biblical references to the Old Testament, all of which are relevant for a deeper understanding of what it means to experience separation and how to remember it: In Genesis, Adam and Eve are cast out of Paradise, thus becoming the world’s first migratory family.

Passover commemorates the Exodus from Egypt. Living dispersed in exile (“galut” in Hebrew) has been part of the Jewish identity throughout history: “Though shalt be a diaspora.” But one related question the play does not pursue and address – where is God in all of this? Why does he not reveal himself and why does he not “look after” and “take care of” little Eva despite her repeated desperate cries for help? Maybe God is present and provides for Eva in disguise, unrecognized and unacknowledged? Perhaps he chose to remain hidden to allow us to overcome our dependency on him? Perhaps – to quote Nietzsche – he is dead and we humans have to learn to do without him? The “deus absconditus,” one of theology’s oldest mysteries, remains an unanswered and perhaps unanswerable question.

Kindertransport is the story of but one human refugee. Eva was an innocent Jewish child, but innocent Native American and Mexican children, Palestinian and Syrian children, have met and are still meeting similarly tragic fates. Multiply Eva’s sorrows and sufferings by fifty million, and you start getting an idea of the kind of economic and political, social and psychological toll the modern refugee problem exacts on humanity.

Come to think of it, dispossession and dislocation is probably as old as humanity itself. Europe’s map was redrawn multiple times during the turbulent migration period (400 to 700 C.E.) during the decline of the Roman Empire. And wasn’t North America largely settled by people seeking refuge from Europe’s religious persecutions and wars, and later due to institutionalized slavery? And it is well known that Australia’s history dates back to the forced deportation of British prisoners. And, who knows, some day we might find pockets of humanity living in outer space, scattered by choice or involuntarily in the solar system and beyond.

To some extent, migration is thus part not only of Jewish identity but of the human race in general. At the very least we should show understanding and compassion for the victims of both forced and voluntary migration instead of maligning and loathing “the poor and huddled masses” seeking to save and improve their fragile and miserable lives.

Another take-home message from the play might be the idea of peace – the necessity to turn swords into ploughshares. The cost of war is too great to sustain for any length of time, and non-aggression is preferable to violence in almost every circumstance. If the world finally learned to live in peace and harmony, with or without God, then plays like Kindertransport would no longer have to be written and performed.

 

Dr. Thomas Wolber is an associate professor of German at Ohio Wesleyan.  He teaches all levels of German language, literature and civilization. In addition to those subjects, he specializes in comparative literature and environmental studies.

Je suis “Transcript”

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The events in Paris at the headquarters for Charlie Hebdo a few weeks ago were reprehensible. The perpetrators’ disregard for human life and blatant contempt for free speech disturbs modern sensibilities. Any violence committed in the name of censorship reminds us, both as men and women and as members of the Fourth Estate, that an attack on journalism is an attack on the public.

In an attempt to summarize the philosophy of Voltaire, biographer Evelyn Beatrice Hall wrote, “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”

These simple words reveal a sacred truth of journalism. Regardless of the content or manner of expression, no individual or entity, has the right to suppress another’s speech. We might not agree with everything we read or see, but in keeping with the ideals of a free society, we must permit all people their voice. To put qualifications on that principle is unacceptable.

We conceded that Charlie Hebdo is a problematic publication. But problematic magazines, troublesome articles and disagreeable ideas should never be silenced in the name of neutrality. Charlie Hebdo‘s editors, cartoonists and writers aim to generate offensive and controversial content, and they have every right to do so. That is a right we, The Transcript editorial staff, know is worth defending.

We are not Charlie.

We are journalists.

The Importance of Grit

 

soapbox

By: Dr. Thomas Wolber 

As a teacher, I have long felt that intelligence is overrated. It alone does not lead to successful outcomes. Over the years I have seen many smart students fail, and I have seen students with average intelligence and sophistication do well. You do not need to be super smart to succeed. Whether you achieve your goals or not is determined less by your cognitive abilities than by noncognitive factors such as personality and grit. Character is at least as important as intellect.

You have heard the word “grit” before. These days it is widely used – in education, athletics, the military and the job market. But what exactly is it? What are the necessary components? Why is it important and why do employers seem to value it above everything else?

Let’s start with the dictionary and the original etymological meaning of the word. Like many other four-letter words of the English language, it has a Germanic origin, suggesting deep roots indeed. Grit is far removed from the French Enlightenment and modern intellectualism. You are more likely to find it in your guts than in your brain. In Old Icelandic, the word “grit” meant “stone, pebble, rock, boulder.” No wonder then the dictionary defines grit as “firmness of character, indomitable spirit, pluck” and lists “resolution, fortitude” as synonyms. Other words to describe “grit” may include ambition, dedication, determination, drive, endurance, hardiness, passion, perseverance, persistence, resilience, stamina, steadfastness, tenacity, toughness, zeal, zest and the like.

Thus, we can now define grit as “the will to act and succeed,” “the refusal to fail,” “the strength to overcome adversity,” “the tenacity to achieve long-term goals,” “the ability to face challenges,” “the capacity to set and accomplish goals,” “the capability to deal with failure,” “the determination to pull yourself through a crisis,” “fire in the belly,” and so on.

If it is your long-term goal to graduate from Ohio Wesleyan within four years and with a good GPA, then, yes, grit is definitely something you should have. Teachers agree that for educational attainment it is more important than anything else, certainly more important than mere brainpower. An average, hard-working student with a fair amount of grit will always outperform an intellectual dreamer who lacks purpose and willpower and fails to act. In my experience, grit trumps intelligence.

Grit is an individual’s most important asset. An increasing number of schools and employers agree that intelligence is an unreliable indicator of future success, which is why they value grit more and more. Yes, raw and natural talent does matter, but to become an accomplished farmer, car mechanic, athlete, translator, doctor, or musician first and foremost requires years and years of theoretical schooling and practical experience. Learning is demanding, and there are no short cuts. Studies have shown that gritty individuals work longer and harder than others, which is why they succeed where others fail.

This observation has serious implications for education and the labor market. If grit matters more than mere intelligence, why do schools continue to focus on cognitive intelligence and academic performance? Should we not equally emphasize noncognitive abilities such as emotional and social intelligence, interpersonal skills, maturity, fairness, curiosity, generosity, kindness, self-control, leadership, integrity, honesty, creativity, fearlessness, and so on?

For example, some of the smartest students go into medicine, but sometimes they sorely lack qualities such as compassion and empathy. A high IQ and phenomenal SAT and ACT scores alone mean little. Shouldn’t there be a healthy balance of cognitive and noncognitive skills? Aren’t schools setting students up for long-term failure if they don’t inculcate character development with the same zest as they do academic preparation?

We are faced with a fundamental paradox here. Academic instruction is entirely knowledge-based. A student’s transcript reflects academic performance but reveals little or nothing about that student’s personality. But the recommendation letters we teachers write for study abroad, assistantships, fellowships, employment, government jobs and graduate schools often stress entirely different qualities than those we impart in the classroom. A checklist I filled out recently listed “academic ability” as only one of 12 characteristics!

A while back, I conducted an inventory of the many noncognitive factors that employers explicitly inquire about, and I came up with a list of over 30 even though I counted things like “reliability, dependability, responsibility” as only one item. A surprising number of employers require things like “physical vitality, agility, vigor, stamina,” including “manual dexterity.” “Behavior under stress, pressure, strain” is important, and “integrity, honesty, trustworthiness” matters a lot. The list goes on and on. Ironically, however, you will not find many of these traits on academic syllabi or discussed in class. Is this something K-12 schools and colleges should have a conversation about? I have heard of schools where students graduate not only with a GPA, but also with a CPA – a character-point average. It may be hard to implement such as program, but there seems to be a certain need and demand for it.

One last point – it has been said the focus on grit alone may lead to egotism and careerism. Being too gritty can have the potential of making you insensitive to the feelings and needs of others and can lead to neglecting community, social responsibility, and the public good.

The way I see it, however, character-based education does not have to be disconnected from morality and ethics – on the contrary! Performance character and moral character are linked and complement each other. For example, there is a social stigma against performance-enhancing tricks such as corruption, cheating, and doping. Besides, the quest for fame and fortune is typically not high on the priority list of gritty individuals.

OWU’s Statement of Aims provides a good example for such a balance. It states knowledge, character (grit) and values form the basis for a liberal arts education. All three are needed to be prepared for life and to become a happy, successful human being. The foundation would be shaky indeed if any one of the three elements were missing. None can stand alone, but together they form the bedrock that will sustain you throughout life.

 

Dr. Thomas Wolber is an associate professor of German at Ohio Wesleyan.  He teaches all levels of German language, literature and civilization. In addition to those subjects, he specializes in comparative literature and environmental studies.

Eber convicted of three felonies

Nicholas Eber in court on Tuesday. Photo: Glenn Battishill for the Delaware Gazette
Nicholas Eber in court on Tuesday. Photo: Glenn Battishill for the Delaware Gazette

By Noah Manskar and Olivia Lease
Online Editor and Copy Editor

A jury of eight women and four men has found Nicholas Eber, 24, guilty on three felony charges in the stabbing of Anthony Peddle ’14.

Eber was convicted of attempted murder, felonious assault and aggravated burglary for stabbing Peddle in his bedroom at the Chi Phi fraternity house in the early hours of May 3.

Peddle, who was Ohio Wesleyan’s senior class president at the time, sustained a wound to his chest three-and-a-half inches deep and a large wound to his wrist that had to be surgically repaired.

In his testimony Thursday, the third day of the four-day trial, he described Eber as “less than an acquaintance” with their communication primarily occurring through Sean Anthony ’14, Eber’s ex-boyfriend and Peddle’s close friend and fraternity brother.

When asked about Anthony and Eber’s relationship, Peddle said he didn’t approve or disapprove of him. He said, however, he had acknowledged that there was wedge between himself and Eber, which caused tension. Peddle said he saw Eber on campus unaccompanied by any students after Anthony and Eber broke up in December of 2013, after dating for 10 months.

On Wednesday, Delaware Police Department detective David McQuigg testified that he and other investigators identified Eber as a person of interest after interviewing some of Peddle’s fraternity brothers. The person who got into the house must have known the security code to the door, McQuigg said, and Anthony testified that Eber had the code.

Eber was arrested May 8 after police found a sweatshirt matching the description of the attacker’s and a pair of shoes with blood on them in his apartment.

The location of the hole in the sweatshirt matched a cut on Eber’s arm, which he said he got when he broke a glass doing dishes. An analysis of the fibers around the hole in the sweatshirt showed one side had been cut and the other had been torn.

Police did not find any of Eber’s blood at the crime scene, and the blood on the shoes from his apartment was not Peddle’s.

 

On Tuesday, Eber’s defense attorney Joel Spitzer argued Matthew Costello, a Delaware man who matched the description of the attacker and was seen with blood on his nose in a nearby United Dairy Farmers convenience store, could have been a suspect.

But DPD detective sergeant John Radabaugh testified Wednesday that it would have been “a waste of time” to pursure Costello. He was not a person of interest and was cooperative when officer Joseph Kolp confronted him later that morning.

Eber faces a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison, according to Ohio Revised Code statutes.

Defense raises further doubts in Eber trial

Sean Anthony ’14, left, with Anthony Peddle ’14. Anthony was Peddle’s roommate when he was stabbed at the Chi Phi fraternity house May 3. Photo: Anthony Peddle on Facebook

By Noah Manskar and Hannah Urano
Online Editor and News Editor

Defense attorney Joel Spitzer continued to raise doubts Wednesday about the state’s case against Nicholas Eber, the Delaware man accused of stabbing Anthony Peddle ’14.

Spitzer showed the jury a series of text messages from May 3 between Sean Anthony ’14, Eber’s ex-boyfriend, in which he told Eber he did not think he attacked Peddle early that morning at the Chi Phi fraternity house.

“… I know it’s not you. Anthony (Peddle) did not target you, but I can’t control it anymore. I don’t know what I can do,” he wrote.

On May 6, Anthony said he would defy the police’s request that he not contact him. “You can text me any time you want, I don’t care what the police say,” he wrote to Eber. “I’ll reach out to you and they can’t stop me from reaching out to you.”

Spitzer also noted Anthony, Peddle’s close friend and roommate, paid Eber a visit in jail after he was arrested May 8.

In response, prosecutor Andy Bigler argued Anthony said those things because he did not want to believe Eber, whom he dated for 10 months, would have stabbed his roommate and best friend. Anthony testified that he still loved Eber at the time of the crime.

On Tuesday, Spitzer argued there were links between the stabbing and Matthew Costello, who was acting erratically in a nearby convenience store three hours after the incident. He had blood on his nose and was wearing a hooded sweatshirt that looked like the assailant’s.

In his cross-examination of Delaware Police Department detective sergeant John Radabaugh on Wednesday, Spitzer argued “media pressure” on the investigation may have caused him to be too hasty in ruling Costello out.

Because police did not get his DNA, search his cell phone or residence or question him, they could not have eliminated him as a suspect completely, Spitzer said.

Police felt certain Costello was not involved in the stabbing, Radabaugh said. He was never a person of interest and it would have been “a waste of time” to pursue him.

Police found an olive green hooded sweatshirt in Eber’s apartment that matched Peddle’s description of the attacker’s clothing. The garment had a hole that matched a cut on Eber’s arm, which he said came from a glass he broke doing dishes.

The fibers around the hole indicated the left side of it had been cut and the right side torn away, according to Suzanne Noffsinger, the state’s trace evidence expert who testified Wednesday on her examination of the sweatshirt.

Peddle was in the courtroom for the first two days of trial and is expected to take the stand before the jury of eight women and four men on Thursday.

Spitzer and Jason Halsey, Eber’s other defense attorney, will present their side of the case following his testimony.

Editor-in-Chief Ellin Youse contributed reporting to this story.

Defense puts forward different attacker in Nicholas Eber trial

The Delaware County Court  of Common Pleas at 91 N. Sandusky St. Photo: jjeffjackson.com
The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas at 91 N. Sandusky St. Photo: jjeffjackson.com

By Ellin Youse and Noah Manskar
Editor-in-Chief and Online Editor

On the first day of the trial of Nicholas Eber, the Delaware man charged with attempted murder and three other felonies for allegedly stabbing former Ohio Wesleyan senior class president Anthony Peddle ’14, his defense attorneys argued another man, Matthew Costello, should be the suspect on trial.

In his cross-examination of three Delaware Police Department officers Tuesday in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, defense attorney Joel Spitzer argued there were links between the May 3 stabbing at the Chi Phi fraternity house at 216 N. Franklin St. and another incident at a nearby convenience store.

Three hours after leaving the Chi Phi house that morning, officer Joseph Kolp said he and officer Mark Jackson responded to a call reporting a man in a deep blue hoodie with blood on his face had entered the United Dairy Farmers store at 123 W. William St., went to the bathroom and tried to sell the cashier his cell phone. The cashier told officers she assumed the man had been in a fight.

In reviewing the footage from the store’s security cameras, it was unclear who the man was and whether he had blood on his face. Kolp told Spitzer store employees said there was no indication of any blood in the store.

Later that morning, around 6 a.m., Kolp saw a man who fit the description of the person at the store walking on Sandusky Street. He identified him as Costello, adding he consented to a search and was “very cooperative.”

Kolp said Costello explained the blood on his nose was from a pimple that he had “cut off.” When prosecuting attorney Doug Dumolt asked Kolp if he suspected Costello was involved in the stabbing, he said no.

Eber was arrested May 8 after police found a green sweatshirt with lettering on the arm that matched the description of the one Peddle’s attacker was wearing in his apartment on N. Washington Street on May 5. There were spots on the garment that may have been blood, DPD detective sergeant John Radabugh said in his testimony.

That led to a more thorough search permitted by a warrant, in which police found shoes that were later found to have blood on them and three other sweatshirts that matched the assailant’s.

Additionally, a knife was missing from the knife block in Eber’s kitchen, and the detectives could not find a one that fit the space.

He was eventually indicted on charges of attempted murder, felonious assault, aggravated burglary and tampering with evidence.

When Radabaugh and detective David McQuigg first questioned Eber at the Chi Phi house on May 3, McQuigg noticed a “significant cut” on his arm, Radabaugh said on the stand. Eber told them he got it from a glass he broke doing dishes in his apartment, which is about three blocks southwest of the crime scene.

One of the sweatshirts police found in the second search had a hole in the sleeve similar to the location of the cut on Eber’s arm.

On the first visit to the apartment, officers found a broken glass in the sink and shards of glass around the sink, including some that appeared to have brown droplets on them. They also found a trash can in his bathroom filled with bloody bandages.

Eber’s charges require the prosecution to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Eber committed the crime.

Judge Everett Krueger instructed the 12 selected jurors and the appointed alternate that if they are not “firmly convinced” Eber attacked Peddle after considering all the evidence presented in the courtroom, they must acquit him.

A reasonable doubt, Krueger said, is one by which “an ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her on affairs.”

The jurors visited the Chi Phi house Tuesday morning to view the scene of the crime. The trial is expected to continue through Friday.

Economists discuss the future

Ohio Wesleyan's Woltemade Center for Economics, Business and Entrepreneurship hosted the annual Economic Outlook Conference on Nov. 12. Photo by Mark Schmitter for Connect2OWU
Ohio Wesleyan’s Woltemade Center for Economics, Business and Entrepreneurship hosted the annual Economic Outlook Conference on Nov. 12. Photo by Mark Schmitter for Connect2OWU

By Hayley Walls
Transcript Correspondent

A panel of economists provided insight on the global, national and local economies to the campus and Delaware community at Ohio Wesleyan’s annual Economic Outlook Conference on Nov. 12.

The conference consisted of presentations by Ian Sheldon, Ph. D., of The Ohio State University, Joel Elvery, Ph. D., of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Bill LaFayette, Ph. D., the founder of Regionomics LLC, a local consulting business.

The event was sponsored by the Woltemade Center for Economics, Business and Entrepreneurship and the OWU Department of Economics. Professor Goran Skosples, Ph. D., of the department moderated the event.

Sheldon began by discussing international expectations, comparing different growth and inflation rates across the globe.

“World output is expected to grow by 3.8 percent in 2015… but the pace of recovery in advanced economies is quite different across the various regions,” Sheldon said.

He said the United States and the Eurozone have large output gaps. To remedy this issue, Sheldon recommended negative real interest rates to boost investment and discourage saving, though this would increase the risk of financial instability.

Elvery presented a national perspective, discussing the current state of the economy as well as predictions for the future.

“In 2014, the labor market and GDP have shown steady improvement, while the housing market remains relatively soft,” he said.

GDP and the unemployment rate are expected to continue improving, according to Elvery. However, he said the interest rate between banks, or the federal funds rate, will likely rise in coming years, prompting banks to lend out less money.

LaFayette discussed the local economy, sharing observations on both Central Ohio and Delaware County.

“The Columbus metro area has added 89,000 jobs since January of 2010, a total growth since then of 10 percent,” LaFayette said.

The population of Delaware County has tripled since 1980, he said. It is expected to continue to grow, but at a slower rate.

High housing values have led homebuyers in the county to spend more of their income, but farming has continued to drive the local economy. However, the biggest strength of Delaware is its quality of life, according to LaFayette.

In defense of the concept of privilege

soapbox

By Ashley Biser

Last week, professor Erin Flynn shared in The Transcript “Notes on the concept of (white, male) privilege.” In his piece, he argued the concept of privilege is problematic, not because it does not exist, but because it is “a potentially poor basis of political response to those painful and all too familiar patterns of injustice.”

I applaud Flynn for airing these concerns and discussing the concept of privilege in The Transcript. But he is wrong — both about what privilege is and the political work it accomplishes. First, the basic definition: privilege is not primarily about what an individual deserves; it is the idea that by virtue of one’s membership in a particular social group (men, white people, straight people, able-bodied people), we accrue as a group systematic advantages that are unavailable to those who are different. In this sense, privilege is not a theoretical concept, but a fact. For example, by virtue of the fact that I am able-bodied, I can navigate the world more easily than those who are not. I can watch Netflix without wondering which movies will be captioned or whether there will be people like me represented in them; I can get to my classrooms without worrying whether there is an elevator in the building; I can visit a new city and expect to be able to use public transportation easily. Because I was born able-bodied, I do not have to think about these advantages, but they are still operating in my favor. While each instance might seem insignificant, over time, these advantages add up—making my life easier insofar as I am not constrained by physical disabilities. This does not mean that I will never encounter obstacles, some of which will be based on other aspects of my social identity, such as my gender. Nor does the concept of privilege imply that my life will be free from pain and sorrow. But the pains and sorrows I experience will be based on my own particular life circumstances, not on the basis of being disabled. The concept of privilege just asks me to acknowledge that I live in a system that is designed for able-bodied people and makes life harder for those who are not part of that group. Hopefully, once I acknowledge that fact, I will be better equipped to fight for a system in which all people can flourish — regardless of physical ability.

According to Flynn, the problem with describing these advantages in terms of privilege is that implies that all experiences of white (or male, or heterosexual, or able-bodied) privilege are the same. But surely, we can see that not all able-bodied people have similar experiences of the world. An able-bodied woman will experience privilege differently than an able-bodied man. Just as a black woman born to a wealthy family will experience the world differently than a poor white man — just as will any two white, straight, able-bodied, cisgender men. As Hannah Arendt reminds us, “we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live.”

Flynn worries that the concept of privilege covers over these individual differences and obscures the fact that sometimes “class transcends race” (and vice versa). But the point of recognizing privilege isn’t to set different experiences of discrimination up against another and vie for who is most oppressed; the point is to recognize the intersections between various forms of oppression and never fool ourselves into thinking that we are immune from prejudice. Just because I do not believe I am prejudiced against those who are disabled does not mean that I do not benefit from the systematic ways in which able-bodiedness is privileged in our society. We have to resist the age-old tendency to set oppressed people against each other and instead recognize that many forms of injustice share similar roots. The question isn’t who has it worse, but how can we make it better.

Moreover, in his desire to recognize the “richness, variety and complexity of social life,” Flynn misses the fact that it is precisely this experience of being recognized as a unique individual that is denied to those who are not white, male, heterosexual, upper-class, able-bodied, etc. In fact, it is a privilege to be treated as an individual, with a specific life story, deserving of recognition. It is precisely this experience, of being judged on one’s own merits — and not assumed to fit into a mold fashioned by prejudice — that those of us interested in justice, like Flynn and myself, desire for everyone.

In his post, Flynn also wonders what happens when we see basic human rights — such as the right to be free from physical coercion or harm — as privileges instead of as rights. I understand his concern; the language of rights is powerful. To speak of violated rights implies that everyone deserves physical security, not because some magnanimous entity has decreed so, but simply by virtue of our existence. However, for those to whom they are denied, rights do not exist. So long as African-American men are more likely to be shot by the police, women’s bodies can be subjected to medical procedures without their consent and transgender persons are disproportionately victims of violence, the so-called “right” to be free from physical coercion or harm is a dangerous myth. In a different context, marriage is not a “right” so long as only heterosexual couples can participate in its benefits. The concept of privilege draws our attention to the disjuncture between right and privilege — emphasizing that what might appear to be a right is not universally experienced as such. So long as “rights” can be categorically denied to entire sectors of our society, we cannot call them rights; they are simply privileges accorded to the few in the service of protecting those in power.

The concept of privilege also forces us to recognize that rights aren’t the culmination of struggles for justice. Don’t get me wrong. Legal rights are a crucial component of a just society. But the concept of privilege draws our attention to other myriad, sometimes seemingly trivial, ways that racism, classism, ableism, chauvinism, homophobia, etc. seep into our lives — even once legal rights have been secured. Take, for example, my experience of able-bodied privilege: is it a “right” to watch Netflix? Is it anyone’s “right” to see people like themselves represented on screen? No. But these privileges are nonetheless significant. My ability to easily access information affects how I can participate in the world, and the presence of people who look like me on television sets the parameters for what is considered “normal” and socially acceptable.

According to Flynn, the concept of privilege focuses on attacking what some (privileged) people have, rather than fighting for the rights others lack. In this sense, he worries that the concept of privilege might become tinged with what Nietzsche terms ressentiment—a “potentially toxic mix of resentment and envy” that embodies the desire to somehow strike back at those more powerful than ourselves. Flynn worries that calling people out on their privilege “becomes just a way of lashing out and ridiculing, of feeling a sense of superiority which one does not experience as socially real, by demeaning or lowering the status of another.” To some extent, I can see his worry. If the concept of privilege were simply a means of belittling the successes of powerful individuals, it would, indeed, be a vengeful concept. But, again, privilege is not about individual accomplishments and deserts. It is a concept designed to help draw attention to the systematic ways in which life is easier and more just for some and not others. All of us lead very different lives within the context of societal structures, filled with our own personal challenges and accomplishments. Nietzsche develops the concept of ressentiment to think about how those who are weak and undeserving react toward those who are stronger and bolder. What the concept of privilege teaches us, however, is that no matter how strong and bold and deserving someone is, some people have more obstacles to overcome than others.

Considering that Nietzsche excelled at questioning our most deeply-held assumptions — about God, morality, freedom, etc. — it seems to me fitting to think about the concept of privilege as doing similar political work: provoking us to rethink our basic assumptions about what is fair and just in our society. The purpose of recognizing my own privilege as an able-bodied, white, cisgender woman, is not to take away from my (or anyone else’s) accomplishments, but to help me better empathize with those whose experiences are fundamentally different than my own. At best, “checking” my privilege means that I make sure to listen more carefully to those who have historically been silenced and work more diligently to dismantle societal structures that contribute to white, male, cisgender, heterosexual, able-bodied, and class privilege. At the very least, I need to be aware of my own participation in perpetuating injustice. The language of privilege serves as a reminder to do so. I don’t deny that the concept can sometimes ruffle people’s feathers and engender unproductive conversations about guilt. But that is why it is powerful; unless we are uncomfortable, we will not act. For my part, the time to give up on the concept of privilege will be when privilege ceases to exist. The discomfort that all of us feel in recognizing our own privilege (be it racial, class, gender, etc.) is precisely the point.

Ashley Biser is an assistant professor of politics and government at Ohio Wesleyan. Her expertise is in contemporary political theory, and she teaches such courses as Democracy and Its Critics, Classical Issues in Political Theory, American Political Thought, and Political Theory, Science and Technology, as well as the introductory politics and government course.

Notes on the concept of (white, male…) privilege

soapbox

By Erin Flynn

A few years ago faculty at Ohio Wesleyan held a meeting on dealing with disruptive students in the classroom. I was surprised. In my experience, OWU students were overwhelmingly respectful, even nice. I certainly didn’t have a problem with disruptive students, so I didn’t attend the meeting. Then I heard that of those who did attend, only two were white men, and those two were required to attend (because they were serving as deans). Evidently our students did not afford the same degree of respect and courtesy to my colleagues who were not white men. I was indignant, outraged that my colleagues should endure such disrespect, especially for those reasons, and even if from a decided minority of students. But I was also upset for another reason. I would have thought that the respect shown to me by my students had primarily to do with my own conduct—with the way I treated them. But now I had to confront the possibility that to some extent their respect was due to nothing more than my whiteness and maleness. (One should also add to this list my tallness, and other characteristics over which I have little if any control.) What credit at all did I deserve if my students’ respect was rooted in their (probably unconscious) deference to tall white men?

The above is a good, if relatively modest, example of what has come to be called white male privilege. The idea behind such forms of privilege is simple enough: some of us enjoy certain advantages (including the advantage of not having to deal with certain forms of bullshit) simply in virtue of belonging to particular social types, sometimes defined as “dominant” or simply the “norm.” Such types include: white, male, straight, and able-bodied. Those enjoying these advantages are often blind to them, since they don’t experience the world as someone who is not white, male, etc. Hence they tend to attribute the various benefits they enjoy entirely to what they do, to their own conduct, much as I attributed my students’ respect to my own respectful and respectable conduct. This concept of privilege is a valuable one. It promotes greater awareness of the struggles of those unlike ourselves, and so a clearer understanding of what particular things would have to change for ours to be a more just and fair society. It also affords a clearer picture of just what is to our credit and what is not. On the whole, the emergence of this particular tool for understanding and describing social reality is, I think, a good thing. Nevertheless, in what follows I would like to offer a brief critique of the concept, highlighting three shortcomings of our typical use of it.

First, there is a tendency in our use of the concept to presuppose a uniform experience of whiteness, maleness, etc. But the white male, like the average taxpayer, is an abstraction. No one is the white male. (Likewise, no one is the woman of color.) We are each of us particular, assemblies of various traits, histories, and social identities. These intersect in remarkably complex ways, making difficult the identification of the privilege enjoyed by actual individuals. This is not to say that there is no such privilege, only that there is never uniform experience or enjoyment of it. Likewise, one never finds oneself in the society. One finds oneself in particular social contexts, in which relations of power and privilege will be peculiar to that context, and which will therefore dramatically influence our social experience, depending on the traits, histories, and social identities that make us up.

No one would claim that the unemployed white man enjoys the same privilege as the gainfully employed white man. But I am further suggesting that the unemployed white man does not even have the same experience of white privilege or male privilege as that other man, though in an abstract sense both are white men. The social relationships of power and privilege are complex. Sometimes race transcends class, as when a wealthy African-American is profiled by police officers or when a poor white person receives more deference or respect in a commercial or professional setting. Very often, however, class transcends race, as when a poor white person has less access to quality education than a wealthy African-American person, or when a wealthy woman endures much less risk of violence than a poor man. Even the deployment of the critique of privilege may reproduce a pattern of injustice, as when a well-off person can cite as a disability what a poor working person must endure as a matter of course.

None of this should induce paralysis. We are attempting to do justice to our experience of the world, to shed light on patterns of unearned benefits and undeserved harms in our effort to advance the cause of a more just society, a society in which our freedom is increasingly real and increasingly shared. But to help in that attempt, the concept of privilege must be as true as possible to the richness, variety, and complexity of social life; otherwise it may narrow our vision, obscuring certain forms of injustice in deference to others and making mutual recognition less and not more likely. If our aim is to acknowledge and give voice to the experience of others, then we must not obscure this complexity, seeing them only as instances of social types. To do so would be to fail to see other individuals as real, which as Iris Murdoch suggests is perhaps the fundamental task of the ethical life.

Second, the concept is sometimes used in contexts in which “privilege” seems seriously inaccurate. When African-Americans endure brutal violations of their rights, for instance, we sometimes hear it cited as yet another example of white privilege. White people, after all, do not have to endure the same threat of violation. That is generally true, but think for a moment about what it means to label this white “privilege.” Do we really want to encourage ourselves and others to think of not having our basic rights violated as a privilege? I understand what people are driving at. It is the fact that I have a greater expectation that my rights will be respected that is the privilege. Perhaps so, but the true moral problem is not that privilege. It is rather the violation of the right. In this context, the notion of privilege seems to get things exactly the wrong way around. It identifies as a privilege what we should rather regard as a right. This curious fixation of the concept not on the deprivation or injustice, but rather on the “privilege” or advantage of the individual not enduring the injustice should give us pause. What would incline our attention in that direction?

This leads to my third and perhaps most important critique of the concept of privilege. There is a serious danger of the concept of privilege being or becoming what I would call, following Nietzsche, a ressentiment concept. The emotion of ressentiment is a curious, potentially toxic mix of resentment and envy, a desire to belittle what one regards as greater or more successful or powerful than oneself, often coupled with a desire to see that other harmed. A ressentiment concept expresses the frustrated and impotent anger of an oppressed class toward their oppressors. Often such a concept is used as a tool to scold or belittle a privileged or relatively more powerful group. When internalized by a member of the “privileged” group, it can express a kind of self-loathing, a curious desire to belittle oneself. To the extent that the concept of privilege functions this way, it is hardly laudable, having abandoned the commitment to principle that gives the concept its moral authority in the first place. It becomes just a way of lashing out and ridiculing, of feeling a sense of superiority which one does not experience as socially real, by demeaning or lowering the status of another. To the extent that the concept attempts to raise the status of some by belittling others, for instance by re-describing their successes as a product not of their own virtues but of structural, ill-begotten privileges, then we should be wary of using the concept and skeptical of its value.

None of this is to deny that there are historical patterns of unearned benefits and undeserved harms, nor that the suffering and frustration of living those patterns is real, worthy of expression and restitution. As I said above, the value of the concept of (white, male, etc.) privilege is that it may promote greater understanding of the struggles of those unlike ourselves. My criticisms are intended to point out ways in which that virtue may be betrayed by certain tendencies in our use of the concept, and so in which it may be ill-suited to the true mutual recognition, and so also a potentially poor basis of political response to those painful and all too familiar patterns of injustice.

Erin Flynn is an associate professor of philosophy at Ohio Wesleyan. He specializes in post-Kantian German philosophy and teaches courses in 19th and 20th century continental philosophy, philosophy of law, philosophy of science, critical thinking and international business ethics.